(a) That's right. The document that Lillian signed was clearly one that contained or could reasonably be supposed to contain contractual terms. By signing it, Lillian appeared to be agreeing to whatever terms it contained. Both L'Estrange v F Graucob and Toll (FGCT) v Alphapharm lay down a rule that, in these circumstances, the person who signed the document is bound by the terms it contains, even if they did not read them.

Although L'Estrange v F Graucob is only persuasive on a NSW Local Court, Toll's case is binding. Unless it can be distinguished on its facts from Lillian's case, Toll's case must be followed by a NSW Local Court. On the known facts, it is unlikely that Toll's case can be distinguished from Lillian's case. This means that Lillian is bound by the terms contained in the document she signed.

The particular term of the contract on which Paul relies to avoid liability was not contained in the written document that Lillian signed. It appeared on the back of a membership card. A membership card would not normally be expected to contain contractual terms. In Causer v Browne the term in question was also contained on a document that would not normally be expected to contain contractual terms.

However, on the known facts, it is likely that Causer v Browne can be distinguished from Lillian's case. In particular, Causer failed to draw Browne's attention to the term on the docket whereas in the present case Lillian has acknowledged the existence of such terms.

Causer v Browne is a persuasive precedent on a NSW Local Court, but since that case can be distinguished on its facts from Lillian's case, a NSW Local Court can reach a different conclusion without departing from the persuasive precedent set by that case. In the result, by signing a document she must have known contained contractual terms, Lillian became bound by those terms, including the terms that were printed on the membership cards.